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NEPA LEGISLATION
of negligence, the insurance company would be more likely to settle with
an injured client than would an attorney who must bear the cost individually,
and who regards the charge as an attack on his professional competence. At
least in theory, an insurance company's best interests are served by paying
clearly valid claims and avoiding the cost of litigation. In addition, the attor-
ney would be protected against malpractice claims, and the public image
of the bar would be enhanced.
In any event, the client now faces a variety of legal obstacles in recover-
ing for legal malpractice. The best interests of the bar would be served by
strengthening the client's protection against professional failing.
KENDALL R. VCiKMas
LEGISLATION UNDER NEPA: PLAINTIFFS' PHYRRHIC VICTORIES
DRAW CONGRESSIONAL FIRE, JUDICIAL WARNINGS*
I. IN-MODUCrION
Many of those actively concerned with the preservation of the environ-
ment believe that litigation is the most effective, if not the only, means of
stopping ecologically destructive federal projects.' In recent years groups
like the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League, and the Environmental
Defense Fund have tackled big federal agencies like the Army Corps of
Engineers [hereinafter the Corps]. This environmental litigation encom-
passes adversary proceedings before both courts and administrative agencies,
but increasingly the search has been for a judicial forum. This stems in part
from a pervasive cynicism toward the federal agencies and their processes.
The agencies' continued responsiveness to special interest groups and the
lack of meaningful environmental input into their administrative processes
has resulted in a situation in which "the problem, therefore, of restoration
and maintenance of a livable environment is, to a large extent, the problem
of the control of administrative agencies by the courts."2 Once viewed as a
panacea by liberals who felt strangled by the conservatism of the judiciary,
the agencies are now characterized by bureaucratic concern with perpetua-
ting and enlarging themselves.3 Perhaps a symptom of this phenomenon is
the alarming extent of cross-fertilization of personnel between the agencies
and the industrial giants they were intended to regulate.4
* This paper was prepared for the Environmental Law Essay Contest sponsored
by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
1. Large, Is Anybody Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmental
Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. l~v. 62, 113; Rheingold, A Primer of Environmental
Litigation, 38 BnooxrLxN L. B-v. 113, 114 (1970).
2. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. lRv. 612, 615 (1970).
S. Large, supra note 1, at 112-13.
4. Id. at 73 n.49. "The Department of A iculture has traded Clifford
Hardin to the Ralston Purina Co. for Earl Butz. Te swap was player-for-player,
involving no draft choices." Id.
1974]
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The significance of the National Environmental Policy Act of 19695
[hereinafter NEPA] is not only that it provides a judicial forum for particu-
lar grievances of the environmental plaintiff, but that it also permits the
courts to open the administrative process to citizens and citizen groups.,
Before NEPA the conservationist who tried to enjoin agency action through
the courts found himself handicapped by legal doctrines that foreclosed a
hearing on the merits. Ironically, some of these doctrines were developed to
insulate administrative agencies from review by the "handmaidens of vested
interests,"7 the courts. The federal agency, in tune conceptually with corpo-
rate economic interests and armed with its own administrative procedure,
has become fully equipped to insure that corporate economic values will
override environmental concerns. This does not result from "evil" intent so
much as from the agency's "mind set."8
Procedural obstacles have traditionally stymied the efforts of citizen
groups to halt environment-damaging federal projects. The question whether
agency action was subject to judicial review as well as questions of standing,
sovereign immunity, laches and waiver could keep the plaintiff from ever
having the merits decided. At best, the plaintiff could lose precious time
because he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies or because the
agency's order was not final.9
The environmental plaintiff faced other obstacles as well. In contending,
for example, that a proposed project should be abandoned because of
potential environmental damage, the plaintiff must, of course, allege the
violation of some right. Attempts have been made to ground such a right
on the Constitution, on a public trust theory, on trespass, nuisance, or on
an appropriate statute. If the plaintiff successfully stated a cause of action,
he still had to bear the burden of proof and persuasion. When the defendant
was a large federal agency with most of the facts and data at its disposal, the
plaintiff was rather like a "David challenging Goliath."10
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
6. This has been called 'the single most important development in recent
administrative law." Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Con-
trol, 20 BulF. L. REv. 231, 235 (1970).
7. Large, supra note 1, at 113.
8. A prime example of this thinking can be seen in one of the oldest and
most powerful exploiters of the environment, the Army Corps of Engineers which
traces its origin to 1802. The Corps undoubtably has a long list of credits, but
apparently it has become so immersed in what it does that now "it is guided by
one dominant concern: it thinks 'big water.' LAYcocK, THE DILIGENT DEsmToxxns
5 (Ballentine 1970).
9. The final action rule prevents a claimant from going to court before
agency procedure is completed, whereas the exhaustion rule, when applied after
the agency has taken final action, may keep the plaintiff out of court indefinitely
because he failed to pursue every administrative remedy available to him. See
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
10. Sive, supra note 2, at 617, 618.. So far none of the procedural aids avail-
able to plaintiffs in stockholder's derivative actions, such as discovery procedures
or counsel fees for a successful party, are available to environmental plaintiffs.
See Citizens for a Safe Environment v. AEC, 6 ERC 1158 (3d Cir. 1974) (plain-
tiffs-intervenors in administrative hearing who had been denied financial assistance
by the agency were unable to obtain immediate review of this denial).
[Vol. 39
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Moreover, it has been almost obligatory for plaintiffs to seek a tempo-
rary injunction because judicial review is, due to the doctrine of final
agency action, postponed until final administrative approval of the project,
and the project, once approved, will commence at once. To obtain a tempo-
rary injunction the plaintiff must show that he is likely to prevail on the
merits,:" a difficult task without data and expertise. Even if the temporary
injunction issued it might be too late; if the project is substantially under-
way, courts may be hesitant to curtail it. The courts have denied relief in
some cases, not because the plaintiff has failed to convince the court of the
harm, but because the project has progressed to the stage where the
investment in the project outweighs the substantial detrimental effects on
the environment,12 or because there is no feasible alternative to the environ-
mentally destructive plan.13
I1. NEPA TO TBE REscU: PROCEDuPAL AssISTANcE
NEPA obviates many of the environmental plaintiffs procedural diffi-
culties. The Act, which has been called the most effective statutory tool in
litigation, 4 has at its core section 102.15 Section 102 directs federal agencies
planning major federal projects which will significantly affect the environ-
ment to provide a detailed environmental impact statement [hereinafter
EIS], which must include, among other things: a) the project's anticipated
impact on the environment; b) a cost-benefit analysis which shows that the
benefits of the project outweigh its costs; 16 and c) a discussion of alternatives
11. Yakus v. United States, 821 U.S. 414, 440 (1944). See 7 MooRm's FED.
PRACTICE § 65.04(3).
12. E.g., Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971). Compare
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 477 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1973) (characterized the dam as
part of a larger project, thus making the percentage of the project completed
small enough to grant injunction). Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp.
404, 412 (W.D. Va. 1973) (decision not affected by fact project was 30 percent
completed).
13. Folmar v. Elliott Coal Mining Co., 441 Pa. 592, 272 A.2d 910 (1971).
14. Note, 3 EcoL. L. Q. 178 (1973). But see Large, supra note 1, at 111:
"[T]be only effective federal legislation on the books is the Rivers and Harbors
Act, [83 U.S.C. 401 et. seq. (1970)], a 70-year-old piece of legislation, originally
aimed at navigation."
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). Senator Jackson, sponsor of the bill, called it
the "action-forcing procedure" of the Act. (115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969)). The
heart of the section is § 102 (2) (B):
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible... (2) all agencies in the federal government shall
(B) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation
with the Council on Environmental Quality... which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and
technical consideration.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970) requires that the agency consider unavoid-
able adverse environmental effects, the relationship between local short-term uses
of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
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to the project.'7 The inadequacy of the EIS has been the most successful
basis for challenging agency action. After an initial period of uncertainty,18
the courts have consistently held that "the Section 102 duties are not in-
herently flexible." 9 The Act is at least "an environmental full disclosure
law,"20but as explored herein, it could be more.
NEPA is of unquestioned significance in making the courts available
to the environmentalist. It creates jurisdiction2' and in itself establishes
standing for well-established conservation groups.22 Standing requirements
are met when the injury plaintiffs allege is "arguably within the zone of
interest to be protected by a pertinent statute."2 Because NEPA grants the
public the right to participate in the section 102 process, this right expands
the category of injurable interests.
In the past we have often accepted the nonsequitur that where all
are the intended beneficiaries of an interest, none has standing to
protect it .... Both logic and experience support the emerging view
that an interest so fundamental that all are within the protected
class must be permitted its champion. The National Environmental
Policy Act has created such an interest.24
Judicial review of agency action is authorized because the Act neither
prohibits judicial review nor is "agency action committed to agency discre-
tion by law.' 20 The defense of sovereign immunity has been virtually elim-
inated because the allegation that an agency has failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of NEPA, if sustained, means that the agency has
acted in excess of its statutory authority and is thus vulnerable to suit.
26
17. This includes the alternative of doing nothing. Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 825 F. Supp. 749, 761 (E.D. Ark.
1971), modified 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
18. See Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
19. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112(D.C. Cir. 1971).
20. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers 325 F. Supp.
749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
21. Delaware v. Pennsylvania N.Y. Cent. Trans. Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D.
Del. 1971).
22. .atural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.
N.C. 1972); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
23. Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 897 U.S. 150 (1970). Appar-
ently, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), denying standing, has turned
out to be a "Pleading case" rather than a retreat from Data Processing. The suit
has been refired and an individual plaintiff added to the suit.
24. E. Harts & J. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 24 Rur-rcxs L. REV. 230, 248(1970). Accord Cape May Co. Chapter, Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 829
F. Supp. 504, 513 (D.N.J. 1971).
25. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1972).
26. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers 825 F. Supp.
749, 763 (E.D. Ark. 1971); vacated and appeal dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E,D. Ark. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). Cape May County Chap. v.
Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 513 (D.N.J. 1971) (paramount interests of NEPA
outweigh sovereign immunity); Brooks v. Volpe, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash.
1971), revd, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972). There are still cases which hold
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Laches may not be a viable defense because the strong public interest behind
NEPA outweighs competing considerations. 27 The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies would appear, logically, to be inappropriate to
NEPA proceedings, which by definition involve the court early, but it is
still viable, as in the final order doctrine.28 One court justified the use of the
latter doctrine by noting that it was the agency that ran the risk of reversal
by not allowing plaintiffs testimony at its hearing.29 The plaintiffs, however,
are the ones likely to be aggrieved by sham proceedings "movig" to, an
illusory final order "0 because the project may be already under construction.
One might suppose that under NEPA injunctive relief would be more
readily available. Since section 102 establishes "a strict standard,"3 failure
to prepare an adequate EIS would seem to mandate enjoining the project.
This has in fact been the view of most courts, resulting in a modification of
the requirement that the plaintiff show that he is likely to prevail on the
merits.32 Since the amount of work already completed on the project is con-
sidered in determining whether to abandon a project, a number of courts
recognize that this means that the test of "irreparable harm" to the plaintiff
is met whenever an agency ignores the "no construction" alternatives in its
EIS and continues to build.33 The general rule has been that under NEPA
"unless there are strong equities to the contrary," projects proceeding in
violation of the statute should be enjoined until the mandate of the law has
27. Sierra Club v. Volpe, 351 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. N.C. 1972); Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 117 (D. Alas. 1971) (all causes of action
except that based on NEPA barred by laches); Cape May County Chap. v.
Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 515 (D. N.J. 1971).
28. The exhaustion doctrine was recognized in New York v. United States,
337 F. Supp. 150, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The final order doctrine barred the
plaintiffs in Citizens for Safe Environment v. AEC (6 BNA 1974 Environmental
Rep. Cases 1158 (2d Cir. 1973); Greene Co. Planning Board v. FTC, 6 BNA 1974
Environmental Rep. Cases 1172 (2d Cir. 1978).
29. Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 438 F.2d 524, 526 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
30. Greene Co. Planning Bd. v. FPC, 6 BNA 1974 Environmental Rep. Cases
1172 (2d Cir. 1973), in which the dissent stated that when agencies use pro-
cedural cat and mouse games in an effort to avoid final agency action, the agencys
action should be considered sufficiently final to permit review. Accord, Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Rucklehaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970)(final order doctrine rejected because deleterious to plaintiffs rights).
31. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
749, 756 (E.D. Ark. 1971), vacated and appeal dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211(E.D. Ark. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
32. Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 1971) (reversing district
court because of strong Congressional policy behind NEPA). Accord, Northside
Tenants Rights Coalition v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Wis. 1972). Cf.
Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington, 6 BNA 1974 Environmental
Rep. Cases 1171 (D. D.C. 1974) (failure to show likelihood of prevailing on
merits precludes injunction.
33. Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882, 886 (W.D. Wise. 1971), aff'd 466
F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
1974]
5
Higgins: Higgins: Legislation under NEPA
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
been met.34 A recent district court opinion,8 5 however, held that the NEPA
does not require that an injunction issue upon a finding that the EIS is
inadequate. This decision creates serious problems for the plaintiff, since
the EIS is improved (slowly) while the project goes on (quickly), thus
lessening plaintiffs chances of prevailing on the merits. 8
II. INADEQuACY or THE EIS: SUTBSTANTIVE liGHrs
Section 102 of NEPA and the creation of the Council on Environmental
Quality, which sets environmental guidelines for the agencies to consider
throughout their processes, create a substantive basis for environmental
lawsuits. The heart of the act is the requirement of ecological evaluation by
the agency; the issue is whether the agency has properly performed this
evaluation. Agencies have tried to avoid the EIS requirement by arguing
that the project was not a "major federal project," '3 7 that the agency was ex-
cluded from the scope of section 102 because it was an agency dedicated to
environmental concerns,3 8 or that its ultimate decision was no longer subject
to review because Congress had already appropriated funds.39 For the most
part the courts have rejected these arguments.
Once it has been determined that an EIS is required, there is some
disagreement whether the agency can delegate its preparation to another
body.40 A very recent decision approved an EIS prepared by the agency even
though the data used was collected by the very company that was to develop
the project 41
A more significant question is what role the environmental plaintiff
plays with regard to the preparation of the EIS. Surely, he is not to
research it and write it for the agency, but there is an uncomfortable feeling
from some decisions that if the plaintiff does not raise a particular issue, it
34. Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 282 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aff'd, 487
F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973). Accord, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA,
468 F. Supp. 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289,
1382 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Stop H-3 Ass'n. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Haw.
1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
749, 753 (E.D. Ark. 1971), vacated and appeal dismissed, 342 F. Supp. 1211(E.D. Ark. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
85. Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338, 353 (W.D.
Mo. 1972) (Truman Dam), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir. 1973).
36. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1321 (S.D. Tex. 1973)(court found that the Corps explicitly chose to continue the project full speed
ahead while working on an acceptable EIS).
37. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 464 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1971).
39. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th
Cir. 1972) (Cache River) (appropriations act cannot change substantive pro-
visions of NEPA); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d
783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
40. Delegation disapproved in Green County Planning Board v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849(1972); Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transportation, 362 F. Supp. 627, 631
D. Vt. 1978). Delegation was approved in Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1112
9th Cir. 1972).
41. Florida Audubon Society v. Calloway, 6 BNA Environmental Rep. Cases
1320, 1825 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
[Vol. 39
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may later be found to have been waived.42 Few decisions discuss the burden
of proof under NEPA, but one case logically contends that it should be
placed on the agency once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of a
violation of the Act.43
The substantive question of adequacy of an EIS has, surprisingly, been
judged under rather exacting standards by the courts. Although not always
comfortable in doing so, the courts have enjoined construction until agencies
complied to the requirements of the Act in more than pro forma fashion. 44
Judicial power to force the agencies to produce "weightier" documents is
not, of course, the same thing as reviewing the desirability of the project
itself and possibly compelling its abandonment. In dealing with federal
agencies financed with tax dollars it is naive to suppose that mere delay-
by insisting on an adequate EIS-will force the agency's abandonment of the
project. This is illustrated by an Eighth Circuit decision involving the
Gillham Dam, where the district court rejected one cursory EIS after another
until the Corps understood that the requirements of section 102 were "not
flexible, but established a strict standard of procedure."45 The original
EIS contained only 12 pages of discussion, whereas the final EIS as approved
by the district court
comprised 2000 pages of discusison and included voluminous
appendices containing: all correspondence and transcripts of public
meetings; photographs; environmental elements... listings of the
literature cited in the discussion; court proceedings and transcripts
46
Even a good EIS which discloses the total ecological impact of a
proposed project and all possible alternatives does not represent a "victory"
for the plaintiff. The Gillham Dam project remained substantially the same
after all the litigation. Nevertheless, after the Eighth Circuit had imposed
strict standards for compliance with NEPA, enthusiasm ran high, causing
one writer to state that "no single piece of legislation has had as great an
impact on environmental improvement as the NEPA of 1969."47 Others were
not so optimistic, predicting that when the agency "read[s] the relevant
provisions [it] will discover that NEPA is a full disclosure Act, not pro-
42. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 6 BNA Environmental
Rep. Cases 1074, 1080 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (see text accompanying note 95 infra).
Cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (rejecting AEC argument that if not raised by party, objection is
waived).
43. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1973),
citing as authority for its position Calvert Cli s Coordinating Committee v. AEC,
449 F.2d 1109, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1188-39(4th Cir. 1971).
44. See e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Wash. 1972): "These
requirements have been imposed by Congress; this court did not legislate them,
but it is duty bound to enforce them'. Id. at 265.
45. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749(E.D. Ark. 1971).
46. Emery, NEPA of 1969, An Attempt to Tailor the Governmental Processes
to Environmental Needs, 26 OKIA. L. REv. 141, 153 (1973). Mr. Emery is
District Counsel for the Tulsa District Corps of Engineers.
47. Note, 3 ECOL. L. Q. 173 (1973).
1974]
7
Higgins: Higgins: Legislation under NEPA
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tective, which requires no more of the agencies than they append to their
decisions a statement of the impact of their project on the environment."'
Disclosing the environmental impact of and feasible alternatives to a
given project does not guarantee that these concerns will be seriously con-
sidered by the ultimate decision makers. There must be a weighing process,
the result of which must demonstrate, by its cost-benefit analysis, that the
project is justified. Common sense tells us, however, that no matters how
sophisticated and improved the analysis used by the agency is,49 comparing
a project's anticipated benefits with the anticipated ecological damage is
like comparing apples and oranges. A celebrated apologist for administrative
experts gives the following rationale for his belief that environmental deci-
sion making is best made by agencies rather than courts:
It may not be worthwhile to spend an additional $50,000,000 to
save $5,000,000 worth of fish . . . . What will be required is a
process . . . under the auspices of an administrative machinery
(to] develop acceptable standards ... 50
This ignores the fact that the administrative agency may be reluctant, if not
incapable, of extending its analysis beyond hard economic data. Further,
there is already evidence of actual manipulation of the cost-benefit analysis
by agencies. The Corps has been known to place a monetary value on
environmental benefits which would result from their project and yet place
no monetary value on the economic loss which would result from the destruc-
tion of other environmental values.51
If the Army Corps of Engineers is determined to spend more money
and energy to avoid the requirements of NEPA instead of furthering its
fundamental philosophy, more will be required than mere disclosure. NEPA
contemplates that disclosure to the public and to the decision makers be
accompanied by a broader outlook in the agency itself,52 but apparently the
Corps has found it difficult to pursue objective analysis and has lost "the
ability to decide not to build a dam."53 Some have argued, however, that the
full disclosure requirement itself, while mandating no particular kind of
project, does produce, even if begrudgingly, an increased consciousness
about concerns traditionally ignored by agencies.5 4 Others believe that it is
naive to expect a pure biologist who joins the Corps not to become a mem-
ber of the "big water" team:
If we want the fullest data to be presented, we must ensure that
the data gatherers have no incentives that bind them regularly to
any particular client group.... [W]le can expect laws like NEPA
to produce little except fodder for law review writers and contracts
for that newest of growth industries, environmental consulting.55
48. Large, supra note 1, at 112.
49. Emery, supra note 46, at 155.
50. Jaffe, supra note 6, at 235 (1970).
51. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1368-69 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 4832 (A), (B) (1970).
53. Laycock, supra note 8, at 7 (emphasis added).
54. Emery, supra note 46, at 155.
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IV. ScoPE OF BEvEw UNDER NEPA
If the preparation of the EIS is merely a delaying tactic for the defen-
dant, then the court's scope of review is of special urgency. Assuming that
the agency's EIS sets out the environmental effects of a given project and
also discusses alternatives, yet, based on its cost-benefit analysis, decides to
go on with the project as planned, to what extent may the court review
this decision?
In the original Gillham Dam decision the district court held that section
102 was intended to give the courts the right to determine whether the
procedural requirements of the act were met, but also said that section 101
did not create substantive rights to "safe, healthful... pleasing surround-
ing." 6 This was in line with the judicial approach to section 101 taken in
other courts, applying the language as precatory, rather than directory. 57
After the original Gillham Dam decision, however, a number of district
courts began to recognize that section 101(b), 5s combined with section 102,
allowed for at least limited judicial review of the agency decision. 9 This
expanded measure of review under section 101 was expressed in an important
decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia:
[R] eviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision
on its merits under Section 101, unless it be shown that actual bal-
ance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental values.60
The same court went further in Committee For Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg,61 holding that despite the fact the EIS had been found
adequate and that Congress had already appropriated the funds, NEPA
mandates review on the merits under section 101 throughout the process of
the project planning.62 In 1972 the Eighth Circuit, in Environmental Defense
56. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
749, 755 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
57. Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 BNA Environmental Rep. Cases 1082, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 1970).
58. This section, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b), sets out the policy of the Act,
declaring it to be the "continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use
all practicable means . .. to improve and coordinate Federal plans [to] . ..
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation ...
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage...
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities;
59. Alcers v. Resor, 389 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe,
350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262 (W.D.
Wash. 1972).
60. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
61. 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
62. Id. at 785. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d
346 (8th Cir. 1972) (appropriation act is mere pro tan to approval, unless Con-
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Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,3 the Giliham Dam case, affirmed the
lower court's finding that the Corps' EIS was adequate (finally) under sec-
tion 102, but reversed as to the scope of review which was to be afforded the
agency's final decision on the project. The appellate court held that it was
within its function to engage in a substantive inquiry to determine whether
there has been a "clear error of judgment."64 This view was also expressed
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke6 5 (Cache River), and has
been approved by the Fourth Circuit.66 Although the Fifth Circuit appeared
to reject such a scope of review in Pizitz v. Volpe,67 a recent district court
decision in the Fifth Circuit was the broadest review of a cost-benefit analy-
sis so far undertaken by any court.6 " Focusing on the NEPA mandate to give
"presently unquantified" environmental values appropriate consideration, the
court closely scrutinized the quantitative analysis presented by the Corps,
and found that it had ignored a duty that went beyond mere disclosure:
To the extent that NEPA does not articulate acceptable levels of
air, water .. .this is an accurate position [that NEPA does not
create substantial rights]. But to the extent that it would allow the
agencies merely to disclose the likely harm without... a substantive
effort to prevent or minimize environmental harm, it is not an accu-
rate position of the role of the courts under NEPA .... NEPA
states indirectly, but affirmatively that under some circumstances
. ..agencies must mitigate some and possibly all of the environ-
mental impacts arising from a proposed project.69
This case marks the outer perimeter of judicial review of the agency's deci-
sion while setting the highest standard for agency responsibility.
V. BACKLASri: ".... Tim CouRT TA u A AWAY..."
As the scope of judicial review of agency decisions has expanded from
merely imposing strict compliance with the procedural requirements of
NEPA to a review of the merits of the project itself under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, a legislative and judicial backlash appears to be build-
ing. A recent district court decision, Evironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke70 (Truman Dam), warned:
gress exempts from the Act. One court has gone so far as to hold that expansion of
a project during advanced planning was so great as to be unlawful without further
authorization from Congress, but that court was reversed on appeal. U.S. v. Acres,
809 F. Supp. 887, revd, 482 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Allison v.
Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1972), for the proposition that substantial
deviation from the original proposal warrants enjoining a project although already
appropriated by Congress. But cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Engineers, 825 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), expressing the more widely held
view that it is the sole prerogative of Congress to say that the Corps exceeded its
authority and built a substantially different project.
68. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
64. Id. at 298.
65. 478 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1972).
66. Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th
Cir. 1978).
67. 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 859 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
69. Id. at 1839.
70. 6 BNA ENvior'wmNTAL REP. CAsws 1074, 1079 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
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'[C]hronic faultfinding' by itself will not invalidate an EIS, and if
a detailed study has been made in accord with the requirements of
NEPA, the duty of the court will then be to determine whether the
decision to proceed was arbitrary and capricious and not whether
another scientific study should be made.7'
In Froelhke (Truman Dam), Judge Oliver acknowledged that limited review
was available, but emphasized that the EIS would be found adequate if it
discussed all the viable alternatives in sufficient detail to enable "reasonable
and informed decision makers to fairly and intelligently decide whether or
not they wished to continue the project in its present form."72 This is not
in itself a new concept,73 but the case can be read as a retreat from more
aggressive decisions which tackled the difficult task of demanding full
compliance before a project could proceed. Although noting the stricter
language of Calvert Cliffs and earlier Corps cases,7 4 the court landed solidly
on the proposition that "emotional environmentalism must be tempered with
rational realism." 5
One might hope that the quality of the Corps EIS's have improved so
much that a judicial hard-line approach is now warranted to prevent plain-
tiffs from litigating mere nuisance objections. Yet, Professor Large may have
been correct in his predictions not only as to the ultimate outcome of the
Gillham Dam project, but as to the future Corps approach to the EIS.76 That
is, although the original EIS preparation in the earlier suits had been
ridiculously, almost flagrantly, deficient, the Corps has perhaps learned to
"play the game," thereby satisfying the courts and effectively bringing NEPA
litigation to a grinding halt.
A close reading of the Froehlke (Truman Dam), however, indicates
that the court was not so much influenced by the caliber of the EIS as it
was by the political ramifications of the increased litigation that NEPA
has produced. The court was particularly concerned with plaintiffs insis-
tence that the Congressional policy articulated in NEPA should be given
exclusive priority. The court mentioned the practical consequences which
might flow from acceptance of such a notion-Congressional reversal.7 The
court, warning about possible Congressional disenchantment with NEPA,
quoted a disgruntled Congressman from an article in the New York Times:78
71. Id. at 1078.
72. Id. at 1081.
73. E.g. Lathan v. Volpe, 850 F. Supp. 262, 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972):
"This court is fully aware that environmental laws may be misused by
those who would like to see, not merely compliance by government officials with
the law, but the disruption, delay and destruction of highway projects in general."
74. E.g., "consideration of environmental matters must b1e more than a pro
forma ritual ...... Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971); "[P]urely mechanical compliance with the provi-
sions of 102 is not sufficient to satisfy provisions of NEPA". Environmental De-
fense Fund v. Corps of Engineers 470 F.2d 289, 298 (8th Cir. 1972).
75. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 6 BNA ENVmrONMENTAL
RE,. CA s 1074, 1078 (W.D. Mo. 1978) quoting, Brooks v. Volpe, 850 F. Supp.
269, 277 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
76. See Large, note 1 supra.
77. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 6 BNA ENvRoNMENTAL
REi,. CASES 1074, 1079 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
78. Id. at 1079, quoting New York Times, April 17, 1972.
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'I do not know how they (federal judges) go about resting these
insipid and multitudinous suits filed in these courts.' Citing one
project, in particular, that had been halted because the Army Corps
of Engineers had failed to comply with the requirement of NEPA
the same Congressman stated that the suit 'showed what a bunch
of ignoramuses' were on the bench and the frivilous injunctions
that were prepared to issue in environmental cases.79
Judge Oliver added that he did not mean "to suggest that courts should
tailor their construction and application of NEPA to accommodate Congres-
sional complaints. . . ."80 Nevertheless, it was his view that "Congress did
not intend to enact a statute which guaranteed that the views of plaintiffs
in environmental cases would prevail over the considered judgment of the
ultimate decision makers.""' One wonders why, if Congressional complaints
are not controlling, he included the Congressman's comments and why he
does not substantiate his view of the legislative intent behind NEPA.
Judge Oliveres views would be easier to accept if one believed that he,
like the agencies, had been captured by some special interest group, or as
suggested earlier, that he had been truly impressed by a lengthy or weighty
EIS. On the contrary, it would appear that the court was genuinely con-
cerned with the result of the "apparent victory" in San Antonio Conserva-
tion Society v. Texas Highway DepartmentS2and similar cases. As that court
had predicted: "litigation may result in substantial legislative retreat on the
part of Congress."83 Conservatism and fear of legislative reprisal marked the
opinion: "'he world must go on and new environmental legislation must be
carefully meshed with more traditional patterns of federal regulation." 4
Froehlke narrows judicial review and broadens what will constitute
"adequacy" under section 102 for the EIS. The court avoided review of the
cost-benefit analysis on the assumption that the ultimate resolution of cost-
benefit questions was for the decision makers, not the courts. The plaintiffs
had alleged that the Corps' claim that reservoir development would "in-
crease the rate of growth of per capita income of residents of counties
where such reservoirs are located" was unsubstantiated. 5 The court claimed
that it was "simply unrealistic" to assume that "this or any other Court is
going to... resolve conflicts of this nature." 6 But the courts have resolved
these same kinds of conflicts. In Conservation Society v. Secretary of Trans-
portation87 the court found that the EIS' prediction of economic gains to
79, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 6 BNA ENRONMENTAL
REP. CAsEs 1074, 1079 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 446 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 938 (1972).
Plaintiffs were successful in halting a proposed federal highway project in Texas
based on the failure of the Secretary of Transportation to prepare an EIS.
88. 848 F. Supp. 838, 855 (W.D. Mo. 1972).
84. Id. at 858, quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish B. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S.
1207, 1217 (1972).
85. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 6 BNA ENVmoNMNTAL
REP. CAsrs 1074, 1077 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
86. Id.
87. 862 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1978).
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the area was not supported by the evidence.88 It can be argued that when a
court cannot resolve conflicts of benefit and cost, as suggested by Judge
Oliver, it is probably because the detailed support for the findings required
by NEPA is not present. Since the court acknowledged that it must review
the final decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard,89 it cannot
logically slacken the "not flexible" requirements of section 102 of detailed
analysis all the way through the EIS. Without this detail in the EIS the
"court cannot ascertain whether the administrative action taken was arbi-
trary or capricious. ' 90
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of this decision is that the court
relegated the environmental plaintiff to a minor, yet burdensome, role in
the evolution of a given project. The court proposed that plaintiffs should
concentrate on
the preparation of their comments on the draft EIS so that the
final EIS document will clearly and accurately set forth their con-
tentions in order that their views .. .may be given appropriate
consideration by the decision makers at a later time.91
This statement implies that there is an affirmative duty on the part of the
plaintiffs to get environmental considerations into the EIS. If this is what
the court meant, it would represent real back-sliding. The court in Calvert
Cliffs made it clear that the agency is the party responsible for getting
environmental issues into the decision-making process.9 2 This does not mean,
of course, that a potential litigant may sit back and let the agency through
all its actions, never offering any input as the EIS is being prepared, and
then come into court and attack the EIS.
While insisting that "waiver" is not an appropriate doctrine in this
area,93 the court in Froehlke (Truman Dam) approved an earlier opinion
which stated:
[When those commenting on the draft EIS] fail to make reference
to the need for further discussion of a particular subject, then it is
reasonable to take this fact into consideration in passing on any
deficiency that is later alleged to exist in the treatment given the
subject in the impact statement.9 4
88. See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
But Cf. Iowa Citizens v. Volpe, 6 BNA ErmoNmmNrAL BRP. CASES 1088 (8th
Cir. 1973).
89. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
90. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 276 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
91. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke 6 BNA ENVroNmENTAhX.
RE.P. CAsEs 1074, 1080 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
92. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
93. In most cases these environmentalists are teachers, laborers, profes-
sors, housewives, etc., who must spend the vast majority of their employ-
ment time in occupations other than watching the agencies. On the other
hand, the agency employees spend their employment time performing
tasks related to the very subject matter and activities upon which envi-
romental issues are based.
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1335 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
94. Natural Resources Defense Council v. TVA, 5 BNA ENvmo mENTAL
RE,. CASES 1669 (1973).
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Such a principle appears to be uncomfortably similar to waiver.
Another implication of Froehlke is that the court's role in environmental
litigation is mainly as a guarantor that the plaintiffs views will be included
and passed on by the ultimate decision makers. In its earlier decision on the
project the court had already retreated from the general position that an
injunction was the appropriate remedy for inadequate EIS.95 It is often
argued that the courts are not the proper forum for deciding "hard prob-
lems of how much to pay for what."0 But in view of the very technical and
prolonged involvement of the courts in this type of law suit, the court is
more likely to have both the expertise and objectivity than the bureaucrat
upon whose signature the whole project rests.
VI. CONCLUSION: ThE ALTERNATivES
If Congressmen are getting irked with litigation, so is the environmen-
talist becoming dismayed with the net result of these "pestiferous" suits. As
always, there is no lack of theoretical alternatives. Those with faith in the
administrative process believe that even if the agencies are currently "cap-
tured" by interest groups, they can once more become "effective organs for
reform." 7 Others believe that as long as agencies have the dual mandate
of environmental protection and economic development in their particular
field, environmental concerns are bound to come out on the short end.98
Because neither agencies nor courts have environmental expertise, it would
seem that courts would at least be the fairer forum since they do not suffer
from the dual mandate like the agency. A possible alternative is coordinating
and expanding existing administrative agencies or creating a new agency
whose constituency is conservational principles. For many, however, there
is real doubt that any administrative procedure can take the place of
litigation in the courts. 9
The question that remains is what heed ought to be given to the advice
of the court in Froehlke (Truman Dam)? Do environmental plaintiffs now
run the risk of having the legislature pull the rug out from under their
cause of action? Even if this is so, abandonment of the judicial forum should
not result. Litigation is of immense value because it focuses maximum atten-
tion on major federal projects, attention which is often shunned by institu-
tions like the Corps which would like the publi's first awareness of a dam
project to be at the ribbon-cutting ceremony.
95. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 838, 355(W.D. Mo. 1972).
96. Jaffee, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20 BUFF.
L. Rrv. 231, 235 (1970).
97. Id. at 231; Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the
Licensing Process: Environmental Magna Carta or Coup de Grace, 72 COL. L.
RE.v. 963 (1972).
98. Oakes, Environmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestionsfor the Future, 5 CONN. L. REv. 581, 546 (1973).
99. Large, Is Anybody Listening? The Problem of Access in Environmental
Litigation, 1972 Wis. L. &~v. 62, 112: "If a Stewart Udall or Wally Iickel gets
fired because he took his oath seriously and neglected to parcel out goods to
timber, oil and coal industries, then plaintiffs and legislators cannot expect to
erase a long-developed exploitation ethic."
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